Work on the new version of the military doctrine was carried out over a year. The result was largely unexpected. Some people recognize the need for innovation 15 years ago, others seem alien to the basic military document of the country.
The previous changes were made to the doctrine in 2010, and before that – in 2000. The current can be divided into three groups: foreign, domestic and purely military. How do they impact on the practice of that change in control of the state military machine?
The first thing that draws attention to itself – to change the image of the world. It seems to be in the foreign group edits not definitive, previously unknown to mankind innovations that lead to shock or stupor. However, some of the provisions prescribed in the doctrine of 2010 as the trends and probabilities, now recorded as a solid, a fait accompli.
For example, in 2010 the doctrine still retains the “remnants” of the 1990s and spoke of the significant weakening of ideological confrontation in the world. Now this passage is gone, but there was another, claiming that international relations are characterized by increasing global competition, including competition “values-based” and “development models”, causing increased tension. That is an ideological conflict with external actors, albeit implicitly confrontation “values”, returned to the perception of the world by the Russian leadership has officially, and not only at the level of rhetoric.
The clearest logic changes in the foreign policy doctrine of visible in the analysis of the threats that Russia is the North Atlantic Alliance. So, in 2010 (although not very gracious in the relationship with the unit) doctrine says only that NATO aspires to the role of supreme arbiter of international problems, but still trying to deploy troops in the vicinity of the Russian border.
In 2014, no conventions no longer: all this supplemented by threatening thesis about “building up power capacity” of NATO, is included in the doctrine as an undoubted fact. That is, Russia ceases to ask questions about the alliance, what he decides to recruit the Baltic countries and places in Eastern Europe missile defense system. Russia perceives this as a given, and the question is only in the methods of counteracting such a direct and obvious threat.
Thus, in international relations, according to the new doctrine, returned ideological confrontation, understood as the confrontation between “values-based”. Example as NATO expansion serves as a model, confirming the validity of the point of view of the Russian leadership.
From this point, and that external military threat is the establishment of regimes hostile to Russia in neighboring states (including by illegitimate bias legitimate authority). This thesis, almost unnoticed by commentators, is formulated so that the career diplomat may turn gray on the transparency hint of military implications, the coating of these words.
appropriately modified and views on the nature of modern warfare. Doctrine states bluntly: “trend bias military dangers and military threats in the information space and the inner sphere of the Russian Federation».
This is a group of domestic political innovation. Increased attention to the protests in the country. This kind of social activity, you know, in fact, as an instrument of foreign aggression, implicitly linked with subversive activities directed from abroad.
Ukrainian experience in 2013-2014 on the Maidan and in the surrounding lanes and generally experience ” color revolutions “has been processed. And judging by the military doctrine, Russia’s top leadership take the threat seriously.
So, the list of internal military dangers have arisen such statements as “destabilization of the political and social situation in the country”, “provocation of ethnic and social tensions, extremism, incitement to ethnic and religious hatred or enmity “and” activity information impact on the population, especially young citizens of the country, which has the aim of undermining the historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions in the field of defense of the Motherland ».
In the first section of the “nature and characteristics of modern military conflicts” instead of a modest formula “integrated use of military force and the forces and means of non-military” – Colorful specification: “Integrated use of military force, political, economic, informational and other non-military measures, implemented with the extensive use of the protest potential of the population, and special operations forces ».
It is very unusual to see in the text of the military doctrine of nuclear states such passages typically found only in the pages of political journalism. And it is not clear what prompted the application of foreign special forces to put on a par with the protests of its own population.
But the logic, of course, can be traced. For example, the last paragraph of the same section – “the use of externally funded and run by political parties, social movements.” A section of external military threats formed “subversive activities of special services and organizations of foreign states and their coalitions against the Russian Federation».
The style of the language makes domestic policy in the field of battle, and protests are perceived as a military threat to the state. How is the selection of goals in this field and what the acceptable level of losses from “friendly fire”, we need to learn by experience.
It’s hard to say how the national bureaucracy, deciphering a new directive would be able to distinguish between “protest potential of the population “as such (and it into an economic crisis can not grow) from the protests, managed and used by external forces. Way to distinguish the “right” of protesters from the “wrong” doctrine does not.
If you suddenly had the feeling that the changes of the military doctrine in 2014 devoted entirely to politics, you are greatly mistaken. Purely military changes are no less interesting.
Serious innovation – changing approach to strategic deterrence. Introduced the concept of a “system of non-nuclear deterrence” stands for “complex foreign policy, military and military-technical measures to prevent aggression against non-nuclear means of the Russian Federation».
Upgraded fighter-interceptor MiG-31BM
At first glance, the addition of the epithet “non-nuclear” is not so so in principle, but it is not. Actually said that to prevent aggression against Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent is not enough now. Especially when it comes to non-traditional forms of aggression, including the use of irregular forces of various kinds – from private military companies to groups of radical militants. Obviously, for such “hybrid” threat of nuclear weapons useless.
What follows inevitably raise the status of general-purpose forces and the costs of maintaining their readiness. Now this is reflected in the defense budget. Previously, there were only inviolable expenditure on strategic nuclear forces. From now on non-nuclear forces do not receive a lower priority.
This is done in the Armed Forces of Russia for several years, with the beginning of a radical military reform under the leadership of the previous Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov. It is worth mentioning that almost the main aim of the reform was to bring the general-purpose forces in a state of constant alert, you can immediately respond to emerging military threats.
Nuclear Deterrence in its classical form, however, remains, and the use of nuclear weapons is possible not only in response to a nuclear attack, but in the case of aggression using conventional weapons, you have created a threat to the very existence of the state. In this preemptive nuclear strike is excluded. Here in the new doctrine, nothing has changed.
The ability of the reformed general-purpose forces to effectively perform its tasks has been demonstrated also in the past year. Part of the army, marines, airborne troops and a number of army special forces with the support of the Black Sea Fleet and the Air Force lightning and ensure a bloodless operation to neutralize the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Crimea. This made it possible to safely hold a referendum on the fate of the Crimea. Before us is a good example of the use of non-nuclear deterrence and how forces act and funds earmarked for this purpose.
The Russian troops guarding a military base at the saddle, near Simferopol, March 21, 2014
However, the role of local conflicts is not limited to non-nuclear deterrence. Just as in the previous version of the doctrine, noted the strategic importance of high-precision non-nuclear systems. If they had designated as a foreign threat, now in the development of non-nuclear deterrence forces and the armed forces of Russia re actually formulates willingness to actively use precision-guided weapons.
An earlier version of the military doctrine of Russia allowed the use of Russian foreign troops only CSTO peacekeeping forces, according to the existing agreements. In addition, the determined fairly vague direction of military cooperation with the wide range of subjects – from Belarus and to NATO. The new doctrine specifies the regional interests of Russia and, in fact, the direction of possible actions in key regions.
As a military ally of Russia attached Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which has agreements on joint defense. Specified interests in the Asia-Pacific region, where Russia sees its task in building blocs collective security system (in other words, to prevent the collision of hostile coalitions).
In the sphere of relations with the EU and NATO doctrine introduced a new goal – construction of an equal dialogue. Earlier priorities in this area are not clearly designated as “the development of relations.” Translating the new formula from the diplomatic language to Russian, we can say that Russia as a fundamental condition of their participation in the European dialogue on security requires a casting vote – at any NATO member country.
This requirement is totally logical to Moscow’s perspective, but it is clear that it is absolutely unacceptable for the EU and the US. Thus effectively fixed formed a political rift between Moscow on the one hand, and Brussels and Washington on the other.
Finally, for the first time at such a high level were announced Russia’s interests in other region – in the Arctic. Firstly, this strategy, development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as one of the fundamental to the new doctrine. Second, ensuring the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic called one of the main tasks of the Russian Armed Forces (none of the other regions of similar attention has not received).
The Arctic Troopers
As is the case with the provision of non-nuclear deterrence doctrine in this case fixes the de iure a process already under way de facto, – the return of the Russian military presence in the Arctic, sharply increased in the past three years.
In general, the new military doctrine is a documented process for military construction the last 3-7 years, combined with the comprehension military threats from domestic protest potential and political realities of the near abroad. As far as adequacy and viability of such a combination, time will tell. However, it should be noted that the classic military external threats and methods of deterrence worked in the document is much better than the internal threat. Detailed study of these threats would not prevent another document – for example, the National Security Strategy.
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